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Book Reviews
What's Left of Critique?
Wendy Brown and Janet Halley, eds., Left Legalism / Left Critique.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002. Pp. vii, 448. $64.95 (cloth);
$22.95 (paper).
Leslie Green*
Wendy Brown and Janet Halley think that "the left's current absorption
with legal strategies means that liberal legalism threatens to defang the left
we want to inhabit, saturating it with anti-intellectualism, limiting its
normative aspirations, turning its attention away from the regulatory
norms it ought to be upending, and hammering its swords into
boomerangs." 1 As an antidote, they have assembled eleven, mostly
reprinted, essays2 that range widely but have overlapping worries about
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School and Department of Philosophy, York University, Toronto;
and Visiting Professor, School of Law, University of Texas at Austin.
1. Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, Introduction to LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE 1, 5 (Wendy
Brown & Janet Halley eds., Duke Univ. Press 2002).
2. By Richard Ford, Janet Halley, Lauren Berlant, Mark Kelman and Gillian Lester, Duncan
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legal rights, identity politics, and the prospects for political argument.
They express no similar doubts about the various postmodemisms that
inspire most of them.
Brown says, "[R]ights secure our standing as individuals even as they
obscure the treacherous ways that standing is achieved and regulated...."'
For one thing, rights have costs for others, as illustrated in a fine piece by
Mark Kelman and Gillian Lester. They ask why students with learning
disabilities should get more resources than other students who do poorly
through no fault of their own. "Left multiculturalism," they think, wrongly
pushes their claims to the front of the queue by representing them as rights
to cultural difference.4 Rights may also have costs for the rights-holder.
Should gay people seek the right to marry? Michael Warner sketches some
obvious risks: for example, same-sex marriage could demean the gay
singletons and polygamists who choose to remain outside it. Puzzlingly,
he also thinks this concern is "almost unheard."5 And Judith Butler
echoes, the "intensification of normalization is not widely recognized as a
problem in the mainstream lesbian and gay movement."6 In fact, almost
every story in the gay press about marriage worries, "Will it make us too
straight?" Indeed, just about the only thing that the mainstream lesbian and
gay movement fears in the problematic institution of marriage is the
"intensification of normalization." And thus the debate is always about
whether one can have equality while remaining outside it, through private
agreements or civil unions. The alternative-equality by leveling down
and abolishing civil marriage entirely-is what is unheard and untested in
theory, let alone in practice.
Several contributors explore the risks of identity and cultural politics.
Identities can constrain. That small truth provokes large exaggerations.
Richard T. Ford thinks that "the image of minority cultures and identities
as the helpless victims of thuggery and genocide by the mainstream" is
"overshadowed in importance by its less overt but more oppressive photo
negative, the production and compelled performance of difference."7 Now,
even to moot that the genocide of indigenous peoples is overshadowed by
Kennedy, Judith Butler, Michael Warner, Katherine Franke, Drucilla Cornell, David Kennedy, and
Wendy Brown.
3. Wendy Brown, Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE, supra
note 1, at 420, 430.
4. Mark Kelman & Gilbert Lester, Ideology and Entitlement, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE,
supra note 1, at 134, 136.
5. Michael Warner, Beyond Gay Marriage, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRTIQUE, supra note 1, at
259, 261.
6. Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE,
supra note 1, at 229, 231.
7. Richard T. Ford, Beyond "Difference": A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics, in LEFT
LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note I, at 38, 60.
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the way some of their descendents feel compelled to wear their hair in
braids would be, well, obscene. But Ford is probably not thinking of
Native Americans-or Kurds, Jews, or Armenians-when he says that the
compulsion to differentiate overshadows the image of victimization by
genocide. Perhaps one might believe cultural genocide of African slaves
in the Americas-the now remote loss of their languages and ethnicities-
to be overshadowed by current pressures to "perform" blackness. But that
is explained less by the productive power of identity discourse than by the
difference between things we can still change and things we cannot.
Left critique's relationship to normative political theory is also
perplexing. Butler, for instance, declares that rights to marriage and
adoption "ought to be secured for individuals and alliances outside the
marriage frame" 8 while insisting that that is only part of the story, and that
we must not allow any sort of view about marriage, family or kinship to
dominate our sexual lives. Fair enough. But what is the ground for her
judgments? We can be sure about an "ought" when we have a sound
normative argument for it. Can critique help with that? Butler says
"politics... demands that we take a stand for or against gay marriage; but
critical reflection, which is surely part of any seriously normative political
philosophy and practice, demands that we ask why and how this has
become the question."9 Notice how the acknowledgement that critique
needs a "seriously normative political philosophy" is immediately silenced
by genealogy: how did we get here? Butler explores how vulgar theories
of sex difference made a come-back in French debates about civil unions.
What she has to say is, as always, intriguing, yet a seriously normative
theory needs to explain not why these theories came back, but why they
are wrong. In addition to whatever critique can provide by way of
genealogy, this explanation will take factual and moral argument. This
applies also to Ford's speculations about multiculturalism. He mentions
that forcing bilingual Spanish speakers to only use English at work is "a
requirement that bilingual employees are perfectly capable of complying
with.""° Ignore the factual error ("perfectly") and consider an analogy. Is
there anything wrong with a requirement that bisexual women have sex
only with men-a requirement they are (perfectly) capable of complying
with? Are we tempted to say, "not necessarily"-on the ground that "[t]o
be encouraged or pressed to change in response to new circumstances is
not necessarily an assault on one's dignity"?" But political morality turns,
not on what is necessarily true, but on what is contingently and actually
8. Butler, supra note 6, at 255.
9. Butler, supra note 6, at 233.
10. Ford, supra note 7, at 54.
11. Ford, supra note 7, at 66.
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true. When I was last at the Alamo the only Spanish sign was in the men's
room: "Cuidado-Piso Mojado." Perhaps monolingualism at a national
monument in a city that is more than 40% Spanish-speaking is not
necessarily an assault on anyone's dignity. But in the social context of San
Antonio, it is one contingently, and if critique cannot see why-and why
that is relevant to any progressive thought about linguistic and cultural
rights-then the left needs more than critique.
Maybe we could improve things by adding to critique some social
science and moral theory, as in Drucilla Cornell's interesting discussion of
abortion. She thinks the best psychology is Lacanian, the best morality
broadly Kantian, and that their combination grounds a "universal"
argument for the importance of abortion rights for women's individuality
and bodily integrity. 2 Whatever one thinks of the details, this sort of
amalgam might seem more normatively promising than the inert pedigrees
of genealogy. So why isn't there more like it? Perhaps because it needs
epistemic commitments that many practitioners of left critique reject.
Certainly no Cornell-style project could manage on the editors'
deflationary terms: "the aim of critique is to reveal subterranean structures
or aspects of a particular discourse, not necessarily to reveal the truth of or
about that discourse."' 3 Contrast Cornell: "It is only from within such a
psychoanalytic framework that we can see how Other-dependent the sense
of self is."14 Whether or not we call that a "truth" about "discourse"
doesn't much matter-the sticking point is that by "only" Cornell means
only. That is not going to sit well with the sort of post-modernisms the
editors indulge.
Things get even murkier when critique combines object-level fluidity
("sexualities'are constructs") with theory-level solidity ("as Foucault has
shown"). In principle, left critique could reflexively destabilize even the
theories on which it stands; in practice it holds its fire. In Duncan
Kennedy's account of the collapse of Critical Legal Studies he says:
"Leftism aims to transform existing social structures on the basis of a
critique of their injustice," while "[m]odernism/postmodernism is a
critique of the characteristic forms of rightness of this same culture and
aims at liberation from inner and outer experiences of constraint by
reason."' 5 Critique therefore cannot yield new truths or new values, but
only new emotions, and especially "the pleasure of shedding Reason's
12. Drucilla Cornell, Dismembered Selves and Wandering Wombs, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT
CRITIQUE, supra note 1, at 337, 340.
13. Brown & Halley, supra note 1, at 26.
14. Cornell, supra note 12, at 346.
15. Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT
CRITIQUE, supra note 1, at 178, 218.
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dead skin."' 6 This is not nihilistic; it can remain on the left to the extent
that it leaves both faith and friendship intact: "we can make the leap into
commitment or action" and enjoy the company of those leftists we "prefer
to hang with."'17 But no one ever worried that sloughing off reason would
leave us without prayers or parties. They worried that it would mean an
end to arguments that one could responsibly put to people who are not
already our friends as grounds for acting and believing other than they
already do. In a thoughtful essay, Lauren Berlant deplores the
sentimentalization of politics, including the "Hallmark-style
sentimentality"' 8 of American privacy jurisprudence and leftish demands
to acknowledge the pain of others. Perhaps Kennedy's celebration of
emotion could benefit from the cynical acid of Berlant's anti-
sentimentalism.
Sometimes critique's complaint is basically practical. Warner says that
the push for same-sex marriage doesn't even work: Baehr v. Lewin' 9
produced backlash, not weddings. Isn't that indictment enough? Well, left
legalism also led to Halpern v. City of Toronto,2" and a court order that has
already produced over a thousand same-sex marriages in Ontario. Why
does one project get results where another fizzles? It explains nothing to
say that the culture in the United States is so much more conservative, and
the appetite for intrusive social regulation so much greater, than it is in
Canada (or in Belgium, or the Netherlands, or much of the capitalist,
patriarchal, heterosexist West). That is true. But we still need to explain
that. What produces a political culture in which people are actually willing
to amend constitutions just to stop lesbians and gay men from marrying?
Could it have anything to do with the influence of decadent forms of
Christianity in American politics? Oddly, in over 400 pages touching
frequently on issues like abortion and homosexuality, the role of old-time
religion never comes under the gaze of left critique. The only mention of
faith is inadvertently deferential. Duncan Kennedy says that Critical Legal
Studies has no disproof of the rationality of legal reasoning; it simply lost
faith in it. He analogizes: "It wasn't that someone had proved to them that
God did not exist. ' 21 Rather, "[tjhe question was 'over' or 'parked.' They
were post-God. '22 This is only an analogy. But it is strikingly assumes that
atheism needs a disproof of God's existence. Perhaps this has the
16. Id. at 220.
17. d.at222,224.
18. Lauren Berlant, The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and Politics, in LEFT LEGALISM /
LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 1, at 105, 115.
19. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
20. Halpern v. City of Toronto, [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161 (Ont. C.A.).
21. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 192.
22. Id. at 193.
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advantage of being less offensive to believers: no one can (dis)prove
God's existence, so we can just pass over in silence. In fact, atheism rests,
not on disproofs, but on the absence of any positive grounds for belief.
Compare: to establish that a couple are married, we may ask for their
marriage certificate. But to establish that they are not we do not need their
Certificate of Unmarriage, and having no marriage certificate does not
make them post-marriage-it makes them unmarried. Similarly, absent
evidence for the existence of God, the epistemically responsible thing is
not to "park" talk of God, but rather to dump it-and if there are no
reasons for belief in the coherence or determinacy of any legal arguments,
then the epistemically responsible position is skepticism there too.
Although the editors and contributors offer some illuminating ideas
about the hazards of legal projects, they add less to our understanding of
why reformers are attracted to them. If we are curious about why litigation
and reform appeal to Americans on the left, it might help to consider the
alternatives. The editors caution: "In pursuit of racial justice by means of
civil rights, the American left entered into a deep collaboration with a
liberal legalistic project."23 But what was the American left supposed to
do, vote? It is not as if there was a vital socialist, or even social
democratic, tradition to support. Even the public commitment to liberalism
was shallow, as is now obvious to everyone. In that context, it is surely
intelligible that African-Americans would try anything that stood a chance
of improving their status: legalism, separatism, "multiculturalism," or
even, if they could get enough capital, capitalism. If any of those strategies
brought even mixed results, others would try it too. Who could blame
them?
Legalism moves in the world of action, critique solely in the world
of thought. Little wonder then that the former is marked by simple ideas,
stark principles, and a fixation on the bottom-line ("Is it good for the
gays?"). The editors are understandably frustrated by their encounters with
that world. But vices in thought can be virtues in life. "Freedom to
choose" is a bad argument for a right to abortion. But it is an excellent
name for one. The left needs not only book-sized theories, but also
banner-sized slogans. These have different functions and need to be
assessed on different grounds. Brown and Halley have tested the slogans
and simple precepts of the legalistic left, and "upon close examination"
certify them "almost always intellectually incoherent."24 If this seems
harsh, we might console ourselves by noticing that in a world of open-
ended and unstable critique, it expresses commitment to at least one
universal truth. Perhaps we can build on that.
23. Brown & Halley, supra note 1, at 8.
24. Brown & Halley, supra note 1, at 3.
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